The Best of All Appointments? examines the evolution of infantry brigade command in the British Army during the First World War. Through a series of case studies, the author demonstrates that the response of brigade staff to the challenges of the Western Front reflected the army’s capacity for organizational and tactical change. The Best of All Appointments? illustrates how the influence of the corps or division under which a brigade served was fundamental to its battlefield performance and success.
In constituting a key component in the chain of command, the infantry brigade’s role was subject to a progressive but irregular transformation in responding to the challenges of static warfare. The author first examines the identity, structure and principal roles of the brigadier general and his staff as it existed in 1914. The profiles of a new generation of brigade staff are then established to illustrate how an increased demand for tactically proficient commanders generated a process of renewal based on merit and experience. The author demonstrates that the reasons behind this process were varied, deliberate and otherwise.
Two avenues of research were adopted in the writing of the book, reflecting the varied interrelated dimensions and conceptual planes within which brigade command operated. On a macro level, brigade operations were shaped by political, economic, topographical and technological factors. On a micro level, the influence of the brigade staff was largely determined by the irregularities of their brigade sector and its configuration with the enemy lines. In order to challenge the orthodox interpretation that the role of the brigadier and his staff was unduly narrow, the scope of the book addresses two fundamental questions. First, the author focuses on the extent to which brigade command’s response to trench warfare reflected the British Army’s capability for flexibility and innovation is assessed. Through an in depth analysis of brigade operations conducted during 1915-1918, it becomes evident that the measures implemented by brigade staff substantiated their role as agents of organizational and tactical change. These measures were manifested through various spheres of activity, the benefits of which were manifold.
Fundamental to the army’s learning effectiveness, was the influence of its pre-war ethos, which provided an enduring framework throughout the First World War. This ethos provided flexibility and enabled the army to recalibrate its approach to learning in response to its increasingly civilian soldier composition. The army displayed a willingness to reach and interact with those with expertise and as a result individuals were able to influence institutional behavior. The book illustrates the role played by brigade staff in the capture, dissemination and codification of knowledge and experience as an integral part of the army’s operational and tactical learning process.
The second question addresses the extent to which the organizational and tactical evolution of brigade command was shaped by the corps or division under which it served. Three key elements that influenced brigade battlefield performance are examined: unit cohesion as embodied within a stable staff structure, the scale of offensive action as governed by the pre-conditions for operational success and the degree of flexibility devolved to subordinate levels of command. Using comparative case studies, the author establishes the pre-conditions for operational success: appropriate training, time for preparation, realistic objectives, accurate reconnaissance, logistic support, sufficient artillery resources and good communications. Within a command culture where these conditions were sufficiently met, the prominent role of the brigade staff helped to ensure that preparations were thorough and training appropriate. By these means, the tactical initiative and managerial skills of the brigade staff were fully exploited. Where a command culture proved counterproductive, with woefully inadequate arrangements, poor communications and unrealistic objectives, the tactical influence of the brigadier general was diminished.
Although brigade command had little control over the broad parameters in which they operated, given the establishment of the organizational and logistic pre-conditions for success, officers were able and willing to respond to the challenges of static warfare and the eventual transition to mobile operations. This process reflected the ethos of the pre-war British army officer class and its capacity for learning and adaptation. These values were sustained and applied to effect through the creation of new generation of brigade officers who possessed the intellectual capacity to control large -scale operations. This book is a lasting testament to their professionalism and courage.
